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an appropriate response?
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Lecturer, Maynooth University, Department of Law
Introduction
D PP v Husrveit' is the second case since the introduction of s 2 of the Criminal Law
(Rape) Act 1981 (section 2 rape) to impose an outright non-custodial sentence for an
offence of rape in Ireland. 2 The case concerns the repeated rape and sexual assault of a
woman by her partner as she slept, often while she was under the influence of prescribed
medication which had a sedative effect. The behaviour of the defendant first came to light
during the relationship when he admitted to the assaults following a confrontation with the
victim and later during an email exchange where the victim asked him to explain his actions.
The emails from the defendant detailed how he had raped the victim up to 10 times and
touched her in her sleep up to three times per week throughout their relationship.
The defendant received a suspended sentence of seven years' imprisonment, having
pleaded guilty at the Central Criminal Court to one count of rape and one count of sexual
assault between 2011 and 2012. In suspending the sentence, McCarthy J described the
circumstances as very exceptional.
Context
A brief summary of the relevant sentencing law and practices in the Irish jurisdiction will
inform the analysis of the case that follows. Unlike the position in England and Wales under
the Sentencing Council, 3 the Irish appeal courts have not adopted the practice of indicating
starting points for the sentencing of particular offences, but rather rely upon the discretion
of the judiciary Judicial discretion, as guided by precedent, is a constitutionally protected
power under the doctrine of proportionality, whereby the judge must impose a sentence
1 CCDP0049/2013 DPP v Magius Myer Husvei . The case is reported in the Irish Times and Irih Imepedevr
newspapers and so any account should be approached with caution as the accuracy of such reports cannot be
guaranteed 'No Jail Term for Man (25) who Raped Girlfriend while She Slept' Irih Times, 13 July 2015,
'Woman Raped by Partner as She Slept Critcises Sentence' Idrh Times, 14 July 2015, D Brennan and D Conlon,
'Face of Man who Raped Girlfriend while She Slept' Irih IHepedev, 13 July 2015.
2 Under s 2(1): 'A man commits rape if (a) he has unlawftl sexual intercourse with a woman who at the time of
the intercourse does not consent to it, and (b) at that time he knows that she does not consent to the
intercourse or he is reckless as to whether she does or does not consent to it '
3 For a recent summary, see, A Ashworth and N Padfield, 'Five Years of the Sentencing Council' [2015] 9
Criminal Law Review 657.
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proportionate to the gravity of the offence but is obliged to mitigate or aggravate that
sentence if required by virtue of the circumstances of the particular offender at the time of
sentencing.4 There is no one, overarching sentencing priority in Irish jurisprudence;
however, leading cases appear to favour a consequentialist approach, i.e. the deterrence of
future offending on the part of the offender, and this approach is, to some extent, evident
in the more lenient sentencing decisions for the offence of rape.5
Though few empirical studies have been conducted, 6 it is widely accepted that the
majority of rape offenders in Ireland are given immediate and substantial prison sentences.7
In the landmark case of DPP v Tiernat 8 the Supreme Court held that a non-custodial
sentence for rape is 'wholly exceptional', though it did not elaborate upon the circumstances
that might amount to such a designation. Tiernan was affirmed more recently in DPP v
Keane,9 where it was held that the 'starting point' for any court imposing sentence for the
offence of rape is a 'substantial custodial sentence'. 10 Research conducted by Charleton J in
DPP v WD11 found that the majority of cases reviewed imposed a sentence in the area of
five to seven years. Punishments below that median were considered exceptional, and fell
within the 18 months to two years' imprisonment range.12 b Cathaoir's follow-up study
does not take into account cases prior to 2007 and so excludes from its analysis the two
cases where outright suspended sentences for rape were imposed; the case at hand and the
earlier case of DPP v WC.13
In WC, Flood J deemed the defendant's remorse, plus a manifest intention to seek to
rehabilitate himself into society, as conditions precedent to a consideration of the
possibility of a non-custodial sentence. As O'Malley points out, however, the presence of
these factors does not preclude a custodial sentence where the gravity of the offence
demands an immediate sentence of imprisonment, albeit of a short duration. 14 WC is
somewhat exceptional in a different sense, however, in that at the time it was heard
prosecution appeals against unduly lenient sentences were not available.15
Related cases are instructive in terms of assessing the exceptional quality of cases of
serious sexual offence. In DPP v McCormack,16 relevant factors which warranted a
4 Deaton v Arrorey Geeral [1963] IR 170, Stare (Heay) v Donoghue [1976] IR 325, People (Attoroy General) v
O'Dn coll (1972) 1 Frewen 351, People (Amtorny Ge .. ral) v Poqnng [1972] IR 402, Sare (Stanbrdge) v McMahon
[1979] IR 214, DPP v McCormack [2000] 4 IR 356 confirms this approach in the context of sexual offences.
5 People (Attoey G e ra) O'Drcoll (n 4), Srare (S)anb-dg) vMMahon (n 4).
6 Key empirical analyses include the work of Charletn J in DPP v WD [2007] IEHC 310, followed up by the
Judicial Researchers' Office in K 0 Cathaoir, Ree Rape e ' - g Ana~yi: The WD Case and Bjood Judicial
Researchers' Office 2012).
7 Cathaoir (n 6) 3. See also T O'Malley, Seotet,,ug Lay and Pmacic (2nd edn Thomson Round Hall 2006) 264.
8 DPP v Tieran [1988] IR 250.
9 DPP v Keane [2007] IECCA 119.
10 Ibid.
11 DPP v WD (n 6).
12 See also 0 Cathaoir (n 6) 6.
13 DPP v WC [1994] 1 ILRM 321.
14 T O'Malley, 'Resisting the Temptation of Elegance: Sentencing Discretion Re affirmed' (1994) 1 Irish
Criminal Law Journal 1, 10.
15 Criminal Justice Act 1993, s 2. For a comprehensive account of the legislation, see T O'Malley, 'Prosecution
Appeals against Sentence' (1993) 11 Irish Law Times 121.
16 DPP vMcCormack (n 4). The accused was sentenced to three years' imprisonment with two years' suspended
for aggravated sexual assault and attempted rape. The Court of Criminal Appeal held that in light of the
exceptional circumstances a custodial sentence was unnecessary.
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suspended sentence were deemed to be the defendant's extreme youth, loss of control, a
blameless record, the display of genuine remorse, a full apology to the victim in court, a
good response to counselling and a likelihood of rehabilitation. Similarly, in DPP v NY, 1 7
where the Court of Criminal Appeal was precluded from giving a full suspension, 18 it
pointed to the accused's remorse, cooperation and previous good character as significant
factors. In imposing a suspended sentence in the case of DPP v D(G),19 the judge took
account of factors such as the youth of the offender, his early guilty plea and cooperation
with the police, his previous good character, that he was drunk at the time and confused
about his sexual orientation, and that the offence was an isolated event.
Given the rarity of rape cases which qualify as 'wholly exceptional' for the purposes of
imposing a non-custodial sentence, it is likely that, as O'Malley points out, 'the best that can
be said with any certainty is that a combination of strong mitigating factors may justify a
non-custodial sentence'. 20 Furthermore, the factors in question are apt to be related to the
offender, as opposed to the circumstances of the offence itself,21 though it is noteworthy
that the case of DPP v Leec2 2 found that this practice is not to be imposed in a manner
which overlooks the seriousness of the crime.23
With the above in mind, then, what makes the circumstances of DPP v Husveir 'wholly
exceptional' so as to break with general principle and impose a suspended sentence for a
rape offence?
Commentary
This section considers the factors that appear to have influenced the court in coming to its
decision, as well as those factors which, arguably, could have been afforded greater weight.
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE OFFENDER
According to reports, the offender wrote to the victim and confessed to using her body for
his own gratification for up to one year.24 McCarthyJ, prior to suspending the sentence, said
that '[Nln truth this case comes here today out of his own mouth'. 25 It is a common
presumption that an early guilty plea signifies remorse on the part of the offender and
spares the victim the supposed trauma of testifying at trial.26 And though the practice of
mitigating sentence due to an early plea of guilty may be an established sentencing
principle;27 is a reduction an absolute requirement and does it constitute a 'wholly
exceptional' circumstance?
17 DPPv NY[2002] 4 IR309.
18 The appellant, on pleading guilty to raping a sleeping woman vaginally and anally, had been sentenced to three
years' imprisonment with the last nine months suspended. The Court of Criminal Appeal affirmed the three
year sentence but suspended the balance of it.
19 Unreported, 13 July 2004. The case concerned a 'rape under section 4' offence under the Criminal Law (Rape)
(Amendment) Act 1990, a gender neutral offence which is defined as penetration of the anus or mouth by the
penis, or penetration of the vagina by an object controlled by another person.
20 O'Malley (n 7) 265 6.
21 DPP v NY (n 17).
22 DPP v Leech unreported, Irih Times, 4 June 2003.
23 The Court of Criminal Appeal activated a four year suspended sentence on the basis that the jury had given
undue weight to the circumstances of the offender as opposed to the nature of the offence and its effect on
the victim.
24 Brennan and Conlon (n 1).
25 Ibid.
26 DPP v Tiera (n 8).
27 Ibid. See also DPP v WC(n 13), DPP v NY(n 17).
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0 Cataoir's study found that '[c]ases wit not guilty pleas did not necessarily impose
strikingly different sentences to cases wit similar facts where a guilty plea was entered'. 28
Though WC held that it is one of the two conditions precedent, WD confirmed that an
early plea of guilty does not, of itself, constitute a wholly exceptional circumstance as to
warrant a non-custodial sentence in rape cases.29 In addition, FennellyJ, in DpP v RMcC, 30
indicated that it would not be an error of principle to refuse to give credit for an early guilty
plea in a rape case, in appropriate circumstances. It is arguable that such circumstances are
present in the case at hand as, altough it may be unusual for an accused to incriminate
himself to the victim in writing; the victim was of the opinion that the defendant had less
noble motives in confessing and was of the view that he did not think that she would go to
the police. 31 Given the evidence against him, surely he had little choice but to plead guilty
Psychological reports indicated that the offender felt genuine guilt and remorse for what
he had done. 32 DPP v Naugion found that a truly remorseful offender is less likely to
reoffend and may be more willing to take steps to deal with his own behavioural issues. 33
However, a display of this emotion does not automatically result in a non-custodial
sentence, given that if an offender is on notice that a convincing show of repentance can
reduce his sentence, he may easily feign it.34 Arguably, in the case of a multiplicity of
offences spanning a year, the defendant's remorse must be seen as less genuine than in the
case of a one-off offence, as was the case in D(G), for example.
The genuine nature of the defendant's remorse may be questioned further due to the
apparent motives behind his actions, which do not appear to have been explored in detail
by the court. For example, Grot alludes to the judicial perception that the rapist is simply
unable to control his sexual desires, rather than rape being an expression of power and
control in a situation where the defendant is sexually possessive and jealous. 35 According to
the victim in this case, the defendant was a controlling and jealous partner. 36 Furthermore,
the defendant stated by email that an explanation for his actions may be the fact that he
thought the victim oppressed his sexuality because she asked him not to masturbate to
pornography as she slept. 37
As is the position in England and Wales, 38 a lack of previous convictions is treated, in
general, as a significant mitigating factor, particularly when combined with evidence that the
28 0 Cathaoir (n 6) 3.
29 DPP v WD (n 6).
30 DPP v R McC [2005] IECCA 71 (unreported, 12 May 2005).
31 She stated: 'He responded, not because he thought he was giving me evidence, because he didn't think that I
would go to the police. He told me quite clinically what he had been doing ... He showed no remorse, using
the sentence I'm not blaming you, but. . . Today' FM radio broadcast, 14July 2015 < www.todayfm.com/I
didnt want to believe I was raped>.
32 Brennan and Conlon (n 1).
33 DPP v Naughtov [1999] 5 JIC 1808.
34 As Tudor remarks, '[r]emorse can also, of course, sometimes (perhaps often) be distorted, deluded, or faked'
S K Tudor, 'Why should Remorse be a Mitigating Factor in Sentencing?' (2008) 2 Criminal Law and
Philosophy 241, 243.
35 A N Groth, Mev zho Rape. The Pybhology of the Offeuder (Plenum Press 1979).
36 Brennan and Conlon (n 1).
37 'Today' (n 31).
38 For example, see O'Bryan [2013] 2 Cr App R (S) 16 where good character was said to be very considerable
mitigation'. For further discussion, see M Redmayne, Chara rr B e i* , rh Cimina! Trial (OUP 2015) 225.
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defendant is of good character.39 There exists some controversy, however, surrounding the
practice of allowing mitigation as to the character of the offender in cases of sexual
offence.40 The danger of allowing mitigation for character in this context has been
addressed formally in England and Wales by the Sentencing Council Guidelines for the
offence of rape: 'previous good character/ exemplary conduct should not normally be given
any significant weight and will not normally justify a reduction in what would otherwise be
the appropriate sentence.' 41 Here, the persistent nature of the sexual abuse scarcely entitles
the defendant to make any great claim to good character, exemplary work record or
otherwise.
In light of the above discussion, it is in no way certain that, together, factors such as an
early guilty plea, a display of remorse, no previous convictions and evidence of good
character, would constitute significant grounds for the designation of 'wholly exceptional'
and, if they did, whether the defendant would be entitled to a non-custodial sentence.
GAVITY OF THE OFFENCE
It is arguable that the court did not pay sufficient heed to the gravity of the offence at
hand. From the available studies, pertinent aggravating factors might include multiple
offences, engaging in a campaign of rape which is not necessarily mitigated by a later
claim of remorse, abusing a position of trust, vulnerability of the victim, and especial
harm to the victim.42
That the victim and the defendant were in a relationship at the time of the offence
brings into play a number of significant factors. This circumstance accords with what is now
accepted (academically, at least) as the 'norm' in terms of sexual offences. 43 As Burton
points out, however, it is arguable that the 'proposition that "rape is rape" whatever the
rapist's relationship to the victim has never fully been accepted by the judiciary', 44 despite
judicial rhetoric evident in cases such as Milberr. 45 In respect of that case, Rumney's study
shows how the judicial understanding of non-stranger rape is 'obscured and distorted by
conceptions of harm and seriousness that fail to consider the full range of impacts
experienced by rape victims'. 46 Though no empirical studies exist on the matter in the Irish
jurisdiction, it is noteworthy, if just anecdotally, that the two cases of outright non-custodial
sentences for section 2 rape occurred where the parties involved were in a relationship.
In the case at hand, there may have been the perception that the rape was less harmful
given that the defendant was known to the victim and the fact that the victim was aware of
what was going on, yet did not leave or report it. These circumstances go to the heart of
39 DPP v O'Nell [2012] ECCA 37.
40 For example, Ryao v The Quee [2001] HCA 21. For discussion, see T O'Malley, Sexual Of/eces (2nd edn
Thomson Round Hall 2013) 591 2.
41 Sentencing Council, Sexzal Off ece: Defzrive Guidenioes (2013) 11. For further discussion, see A Ashworth,
Seueo tug ad Cu -ial . e (6th edn CUP 2015) 190.
42 DPP v WD (n 6), 0 Cathaoir (n 6).
43 See, Rape Crisis Network Ireland, NattoalRape Cisi Statiics 2014, which show that 93% of perpetrators of
sexual violence are known to the person against whom they perpetrate the abuse, 20.
44 M Burton, LegalRespones to Domestic Violece (Routledge Cavendish 2008) 69.
45 Millbergy [2003] 1 WLR 546, See also AG Ref No 44 of 2004 (Keith E) [2005] 1 Cr App R (S) 59.
46 P N S Rumney, 'Progress at a Price: The Construction of Non Stranger Rape in the Millberry Sentencing
Guidelines' (2003) 66(6) Modern Law Review 870, 883. See also P N S Rumney, 'When Rape Isn't Rape: Court
of Appeal Sentencing Practice in Cases of Marital and Relationship Rape' (1999) 19 Oxford Journal of Legal
Studies 243.
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the especial harm that may be caused by relationship rape. 47 For, as Finkelhor and Ylo
observe, '[w]hen you are raped by a stranger you have to live with a frightening memory.
When you are raped by your husband, you have to live with your rapist.'48 In her impact
statement, the victim described her life as being destroyed by the abuse. She gave up her job,
moved in with her parents, attempted suicide and suffered from post-traumatic stress
disorder, eating disorders and anxiety. Following WC, a sentencing court is obliged to take
into account any effect (whether long-term or otherwise) of the offence on the victim. 49
Relationship rape is rarely an isolated event.50 Though there is evidence that the accused
raped and sexually assaulted the victim on a regular basis between 2011 and 2012, the
conviction relates to just one count of rape. It is questionable, therefore, whether the court
has taken into account the systematic nature of the abuse that the victim was subjected to.
Such actions are the result of a significant breach of trust, a factor not always given
credence in the context of relationship rape.
51
In his email to the victim, the offender stated: 'I convinced myself it was a victimless
crime because you were asleep... I didn't want to hurt you.'52 Far from simply indicating
a supposed guilty conscience, the offender's actions and self-justifications in these
statements point to a distinct lack of concern as to the dignity and autonomy of his partner,
coupled with a callous determination to have sexual intercourse with her, repeatedly,
regardless of her wishes. The lack of consciousness on the part of the victim in no way
dilutes the potency of the offence of rape. 53 If anything, the violation of the victim as she
slept in her own bed points to an innate vulnerability on her part, of which the defendant
took advantage. Indeed, the Court of Criminal Appeal in Keane acknowledged the right of
an individual to feel safe in their bed as they sleep.54
In light of the above, one must question whether there remains an unconscious tinge of
the 'less serious' about this case, merely because the couple shared a bed. This is not an
outlandish suggestion in light of the evidence discussed above, given that the marital rape
exemption was abolished in Ireland only as recently as 1990. 55
Conclusion
In exercising his discretion to impose a non-custodial sentence for the offence of rape,
McCarthyJ adhered appropriately to the principle of proportionality by taking account of
the particular circumstances of the offender in mitigation. The fact that the judge saw fit to
impose a seven-year sentence, which is at the high end of the median range according to
VD, suggests he considered the offence to be of a serious nature. The fact that the judge
suspended that sentence in its entirety warrants consideration of whether he gave undue
weight to the circumstances of the offender over and above the gravity of the crime. 56
47 For example, see D Russell, Rape in Marriage (Indiana University Press 1990).
48 D Finkelhor and K Yllo, Liceice to Rape: SexualAbue of Wive (The Free Press 1985) 118.
49 CriminalJustice Act 1993, s 5.
50 Finkelhor and Yllo (n 48).
51 Burton (n 44) 70.
52 Brennan and Conlon (n 1).
53 R v Bree [2007] EWCA 256.
54 DPP v Leec (n 22).
55 Criminal Law (Rape) (Amendment) Act 1990, s 5. The abolition of the exemption in England and Wales came
in 1991, following the case of R v R [1991] 2 WLR 1065.
56 Unreported, 16h Time, 4 June 2003.
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Though the offence was not aggravated by 'additional' violent assault, (the offence of
rape itself being inherently violent) it may be aggravated by the fact that the victim was
raped by a person she trusted, in her own home, as she slept in her own bed (under the
influence of medication) and on multiple occasions. That said, it was appropriate that
McCarthy J considered the question of a 'wholly exceptional' designation, in light of the
defendant's remorse and his intention to seek rehabilitation. 57 However, a 'wholly
exceptional' case does not of necessity point to a non-custodial sentence. 58 Indeed, it is
arguable that such a case would warrant a short (below median) prison sentence, as opposed
to a long suspended sentence, given that a long sentence would indicate a more serious set
of circumstances. 59 This approach appears to have been reflected in English jurisprudence
prior to the introduction of Sentencing Guidelines. 60 Whether the Court of Appeal will
share this view is another question.61
57 DPPvWC(n 13).
58 DPP v NY (n 17), DPP v Keane (n 9). For discussion, see O'Malley (n 40) 657.
59 See O'Malley (n 14).
60 For example, see R v Taylor [1983] 5 Cr App R (S) 241, where the Court of Appeal substituted a probation
order for a three year prison sentence where both parties had a learning disability and the offender was not
considered to be a danger to the public.
61 At the time of writing, it is understood that the Director of Public Prosecutions has lodged review papers
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